Gettin’ on Down with State Security and Public Security (in China)

White Paper Delivered at a Recent Conference in Washington, DC

Insights into China's Security Landscape

Now that we've heard some details from Peter about the structure of China's Public Security and State Security organs, I would like to provide insights into how they work with foreigners and foreign enterprises. These insights are based on my experiences in China between 1991 and 2016, and the information I have indicates that they remain current.

Understanding the Role of Foreign Affairs Offices

To begin with, rest assured that foreign affairs offices and functionaries, long nicknamed “barbarian handlers,” are there primarily to “handle” you. They are necessary to know but fundamentally spineless. Their role is to gather information about foreigners and foreign organizations, offer tea and sympathy when trouble arises, and relay news, good or bad. However, the real power in the locality where you operate belongs to other actors: the military, top party officials (who generally stay out of sight), subordinate officials in government, and the “knives” they wield: the PSBs, SSBs, Chinese Customs, and other regulatory agencies such as the State Administration for Industry and Commerce.

The Changing Landscape of Connections

It is possible to establish “connections” to these bureaus, but “guanxi” is less effective than a decade ago due to Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption and counterespionage campaigns. These campaigns have changed the landscape of what is permissible. The fact that the campaigns continue indicates that they are incomplete. China’s culture of corruption may prove to be more resilient than often supposed, but it is no longer as open as before.

To foster trust and a sense of obligation (to the extent that is still possible), it is better to offer something that has no tangible monetary value, yet still brings credit to the relevant organ concerned. Your local staff, including PR or Communications and legal counsel, will be able to apply better imagination than I can offer. Some examples include:

• English classes for police

• Training in technical matters where no U.S. export license is needed

• Introduction to a relevant topic in business administration, foreign trade and markets, or a neutral topic in current events

  
  

In other words, something that benefits the collective, not individuals. What you choose to do depends on your location and the nature of your interlocutors. One hazard to this strategy that might arise is if it is found later to have enabled various repressive actions against minorities and dissidents.

Distinctions Between Security Organs

Such offers might work for Public Security organs but not for State Security, SAIC, and Chinese Customs. These agencies keep their distance from foreigners except those they are investigating—one of the primary differences between PSBs and these other organs. PSBs are more willing to have contact because they are responsible for the foreigners in their jurisdictions and are expected to maintain contact at a certain level.

Public Security has been described to me by Chinese insiders with terms like “rude and rough,” while State Security is “menacing and dangerous.” This is reflected in their operations that affect foreigners. Some examples from the ground include:

• Both insert (打进去) agents into your staff to monitor your operation but look for different things. SSBs want to know if there are any non-official cover spies among your people, while PSBs focus on threats to what they see as social “stability” as well as illegal behavior.

• Both also recruit (拉出来) people already on your staff for the same purpose.

  
  

• Both would react strongly if members of your expat community decide to try evangelizing among the local population or if they start attending underground churches.

  
  

• Both will be highly interested if your company conducts TSCM work on premises.

  
  

I was once quizzed about my TSCM work by members of the Shanghai CCP Committee inside my U.S. company. I was told by my American management to just go ahead and answer their questions. I assured the comrades that we did not intend to infringe on the sovereign rights of the organs of state security. Our equipment, from a company based in Tennessee (which was known as they had hundreds of customers in China), was designed to find intermediate-level electronic devices likely used by our competitors, not the cutting-edge stuff that we were certain the organs of state security employed.

The Importance of Off-Site Investigations

Both will be more interested in off-site investigations that your security personnel conduct than your on-site investigations. I conducted several joint investigations with the local PSB in Dalian and Shanghai about crimes committed against the company. I liaised with these and other local PSBs in China to look into laptop thefts, assaults, a kidnapping, and potential hazards during upcoming VIP visits to China.

Background Checks and Trust Positions

I’m sure that everyone here is careful about background checks, especially those done for positions of trust. You might consider designating expat assignments in China as positions of trust, too, for the following reason. Chinese people living abroad are now under much greater scrutiny by the CCP than during past periods. If you send someone to China who has a history of anti-CCP activity, even a photo taken of them at one little anti-Xi demonstration, they could find themselves under investigation and even detention in China after arrival. That’s a crying shame, but it’s also a fact.

Conclusion: The Broader Implications

In conclusion, there is a reason why the FBI calls China’s effort to steal technology and conduct other spying and various influence operations a “whole of society” effort by Beijing as they pursue their worldwide espionage and influence offensive. Xi is trying to change the culture of the whole country, not just that of Uyghurs and Tibetans, but also of Han Chinese. The recent set of intelligence and counterespionage laws ultimately aim, in my opinion, to eliminate the traditional choice given to Han Chinese of keeping your head down, making a living, and minding your own business, which developed in the post-Mao period. Now one slogan is “everyone has the responsibility to fight against espionage and spying” [反奸防谍人人有责].

As espionage laws make cooperation more mandatory than previously, millennials and others (less so their parents) in China’s increasingly consumerist and foreign-aware society are becoming more aware of the aims and abilities of the CCP. The test for the regime as we approach the 2030s will be how effective their drive to increase mass compliance becomes.

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I think it's more like "whole of system" as only a small slice of China is really involved. That's an argument I'm making in my upcoming book.